Key takeaways
The airline industry is cyclical and heavily impacted by economic conditions. Airlines thrive when travel demand is strong but struggle during recessions or crises, making them a high-risk, high-reward investment.
Competition is increasing, especially from low-cost carriers. Established airlines like Air Canada and WestJet face growing pressure from budget airlines, forcing them to adapt their pricing and service models.
Diversification within the industry matters. While pure-play airlines like Air Canada and Transat are directly exposed to travel trends, companies like Onex offer indirect exposure with a broader investment strategy.
3 stocks I like better than the ones on this list.In This Article
- Chorus Aviation Inc. (CHR.TO)
- Exchange Income Corp. (EIF.TO)
- Air Canada (AC.TO)
Chorus Aviation Inc. (TSX: CHR)
Chorus Aviation Inc. is a Canadian aviation holding company that specializes in regional airline operations, contract flying, and aviation services...
Competitive Edge
- The Capacity Purchase Agreement with Air Canada locks in fixed fees, flight-hour rates and incentive payments, insulating Chorus from the fare and load-factor volatility that hits mainline carriers directly.
- Jazz Aviation's regional fleet and crew base under the Air Canada Express brand create switching costs for Air Canada itself, since replacing an established regional partner mid-contract would be operationally disruptive.
- Zero net debt gives Chorus optionality that most regional carriers lack, whether that means aircraft leasing negotiations, opportunistic buybacks, or weathering a slow patch in flying hours without covenant pressure.
By the Numbers
- Net debt sits at zero with total debt reported as zero, giving Chorus a Balance Sheet grade of 8.5/10 and full flexibility to fund fleet commitments or buy back stock without refinancing risk.
- ROIC of 15.9% comfortably exceeds the cost of capital for a contracted regional carrier, and the company generated this while trading at just 7.8x EV/EBITDA against a 6.0x five-year average.
- Three year total shareholder return compounded at 19.2% annually including dividends, well above the 0.7% five year annualized figure, pointing to a sharp recent re-rating rather than a slow grind.
- Dividend safety is unusually strong: the payout consumes only 13% of free cash flow, leaving significant room before the 2% shareholder yield becomes any kind of stretch.
- Share count fell 10.3% over the past year, a buyback pace aggressive enough to explain most of the gap between the 34.8% EPS decline and the milder 5.8% EBIT decline.
Risk Factors
- Revenue fell 3.6% year over year and 6.3% annually over three years, so the current 15.2x P/E versus the 7.5x five-year average is being paid for a business that is still shrinking on top line.
- EBITDA dropped 58.2% year over year and 39.5% annually over three years, a much sharper decline than the 6.3% revenue drop, meaning fixed costs are not scaling down with the CPA-driven revenue base.
- Trailing EPS of $3.01 compares to analyst estimates of $2.50 for next year, implying earnings actually shrink further even as the stock trades near 6.8% off its 52-week high.
- Management grade sits at 4.1/10, and the accruals signal shows cash collected running 2% of assets ahead of reported profit, a gap worth tracking for earnings quality.
- FCF yield is reported at 0.0% against a 5-year average of 0.3%, a full reversal that makes the 5.2x P/FCF multiple harder to reconcile with the cash generation implied by the $88.85 million unlevered FCF figure.
Exchange Income Corp. (TSX: EIF)
Exchange Income Corporation (EIC) is a Canadian holding company that operates through a disciplined acquisition strategy, focusing on niche markets with high barriers to entry. The company's business model is divided into two primary segments: Aerospace & Aviation, which generates approximately 69% of total revenue, and Manufacturing, which accounts for the remaining 31%...
Competitive Edge
- The northern Manitoba, Nunavut and Ontario route networks are effectively regulated monopolies by economics rather than statute. Communities with no road access need scheduled service, medevac and cargo from one carrier, and route density plus local employment agreements make entry uneconomic for a challenger.
- Medevac and air ambulance contracts with provincial health authorities are multi-year, cost-indexed and tendered rarely. That revenue behaves like an infrastructure concession, which is why Aerospace EBITDA margin held near 29% through a 30% revenue year.
- Regional One's leasing and parts trading arm lets EIF monetize used CRJ, Dash 8 and King Air airframes and engines to third-party operators, giving it a second use for fleet assets its own airlines retire. The 139-engine portfolio is the profitable end of that flywheel.
- Management has resisted buying into fragmented, competitive industries and sticks to niches where the acquired business is the only credible supplier. Environmental access mats for utility rights-of-way and window manufacturing for multi-family construction are both distribution-locked, not commodity businesses.
- The holding structure lets EIF bid for assets too small for private equity and too specialized for strategics, then supply capital at group cost. That sourcing advantage, not operating genius, is the real engine behind a 37% three-year total return.
By the Numbers
- Aerospace EBITDA compounded from $288M in FY2021 to $630M in FY2025 while the aircraft and engine lease portfolio grew from 64 aircraft and 81 engines to 70 and 139. Asset-backed earnings, not just flying hours, now carry the segment.
- Operating cash flow runs 3.48x net income and OCF per share is $12.49 against $3.12 of EPS. The gap is depreciation on a fleet that is mostly owned, so reported earnings understate the cash the business actually collects.
- Manufacturing adjusted EBITDA swung from -15.5% in FY2024 to +20.5% in FY2025 on 11.8% revenue growth, with margin back to 16.2% of segment sales. The window and environmental access businesses have stopped being the drag they were.
- Interest coverage of 6.36x against net debt/EBITDA of 3.03x is a better combination than the 1.38x debt/equity implies, because book equity is depressed by years of paying out most of reported earnings rather than retaining them.
- Head office cost of $59.4M is 1.8% of revenue even after growing 22% last year. For a serial acquirer running two dozen operating subsidiaries, that is a thin corporate overhead layer and it explains why acquired EBITDA drops through.
Risk Factors
- Capex was $15.07 per share against $12.49 of operating cash flow, a 1.21x capex/OCF ratio, and capex/depreciation of 2.0x. Reported free cash flow of -$2.58 per share funds a $2.73 dividend, so the payout is financed by the balance sheet.
- Share count grew 4.9% in the last year and 6.4% a year from FY2022 to FY2025. Revenue grew 16.8% a year over that window but implied EPS only 8.3% a year, so equity issuance for deals is taking roughly half the top-line gain.
- Aerospace capex jumped 47.1% to $589M in FY2025, well ahead of the segment's 30.3% revenue growth and 20.2% EBITDA growth. Spending is running ahead of the earnings it has so far produced.
- ROIC of 6.87% sits below any plausible after-tax cost of capital on 2.6x turns of debt, even after improving from 3% in FY2020. Goodwill and intangibles are 37% of assets, so the acquisition premiums are embedded in that denominator.
- Quick ratio of 0.86 and cash of $1.43 per share mean working capital is carried on revolver capacity. DSO of 68.7 days on largely government and Indigenous-community counterparties is long for a service business collecting monthly.
Air Canada (TSX: AC)
Air Canada operates as a full-service global airline, generating the vast majority of its revenue from passenger ticket sales, supplemented by its Air Canada Cargo division and the Aeroplan loyalty program. The company's geographic footprint is highly diversified, encompassing extensive domestic routes within Canada, transborder flights to the United States, and international long-haul routes across Europe, Asia, Australia, and Latin America...
Competitive Edge
- Aeroplan loyalty program and the negative cash conversion cycle give Air Canada a working capital structure closer to a bank than a typical airline, with float from advance ticket sales and mileage sales funding operations before flights occur.
- Hub-and-spoke dominance at Toronto Pearson and Montreal Trudeau, combined with Canada's restrictive cabotage rules, limits foreign carrier competition on domestic and many transborder routes in ways US majors do not enjoy at home.
- Atlantic network scale (Star Alliance joint venture with United and Lufthansa) gives Air Canada a disproportionate share of Canada-Europe traffic that low-cost entrants cannot easily replicate given slot constraints at European hubs.
- Management's willingness to buy back stock below the five-year median multiple, per the grading engine, suggests capital allocation discipline uncommon in a sector known for chasing growth at the top of the cycle.
By the Numbers
- Total shareholder yield of 14.0% (9% debt paydown/buybacks split plus repurchases) comes alongside net debt falling to $5.78B against EBITDA of roughly 2.2x, showing deleveraging is happening even as cash is returned.
- ROIC improved from -14% in FY2020 to 2.4% in FY2025 per the Management grade, a genuine turnaround in capital efficiency after the pandemic wiped out returns entirely.
- OCF running 8.6x reported net income and cash collection outpacing profit by 7.9% of assets signals earnings quality well ahead of the income statement, likely reflecting Aeroplan deferred revenue and working capital timing rather than weak accruals.
- Cash conversion cycle of negative 51 days (DPO of 80 days versus DSO of 20) means Air Canada is effectively financed by suppliers and ticket holders, a structural float advantage common to airlines with loyalty programs.
- 48% of buyback dollars were deployed when the stock traded below its own five-year median multiple, per the Management grade, indicating repurchases were value-conscious rather than habitual.
Risk Factors
- Interest coverage of 4.5x on the standard calculation but flagged as 0.9x in the Balance Sheet grade using EBIT, meaning EBIT alone barely covers interest expense once non-operating items are stripped out, a much tighter cushion than headline ratios suggest.
- FCF fell 95% YoY and 39% on a 3-year CAGR basis even as shareholder distributions hit roughly $1.5B, meaning capital returns are being funded from the balance sheet or debt paydown timing, not current cash generation.
- Current ratio of 0.60x and quick ratio of 0.53x sit well below 1.0x, a chronic airline trait, but combined with debt/equity of 3.52x it leaves little room for a demand shock before liquidity becomes a real constraint.
- Tangible book value per share is negative $6.29 despite a $9.06 book value per share, meaning intangibles and goodwill (13.4% and 9.7% of assets) are propping up the equity base entirely.
- US Transborder passenger revenue declined 10.4% YoY to $3.83B in FY2025, the first outright segment contraction since the pandemic recovery began, a possible early read on softening cross-border demand.