Key takeaways
- Diversification is the real edge: This list spans energy, mining, retail, healthcare, and alternative investments, which is exactly the kind of sector mix that builds durable RRSP wealth instead of concentrating risk in one corner of the market.
- Small caps with real substance: These aren’t speculative lottery tickets. Every name here generates actual cash flow and operates in industries with clear demand drivers, which matters a lot more than hype when you’re building a retirement portfolio you need to trust for decades.
- Concentration risk cuts both ways: With a focused list of six companies across different sectors, one bad earnings report or commodity price swing can hit your portfolio harder than you’d expect. Size your positions carefully and make sure no single name becomes an oversized bet in your RRSP.
Your RRSP is one of the most powerful wealth-building tools available to Canadian investors. Tax-deferred compounding over 20 or 30 years can turn modest contributions into serious money. But the account structure only does half the work. What you actually put inside it matters just as much.
I think most people default to the obvious choices here. Bank stocks, pipeline companies, maybe an all-in-one ETF. Nothing wrong with that. Those are solid foundations. The issue is that by sticking exclusively to mega caps and household names, you’re often paying full price for slow growth. In a tax-deferred account where compounding is the entire point, growth rate matters enormously.
That’s why I went in a different direction with this list. I specifically looked for companies where the valuation gives you room to compound, not names already priced at 25x earnings with mid-single-digit growth. Some of these are small caps that fly under the radar. Others are mid-sized businesses with real earnings power that the market hasn’t fully appreciated yet.
The mix is deliberately eclectic. A copper producer tied to electrification demand. A holding company with a deep value bent. A manufacturer with global reach. These aren’t the safe, boring picks you’ll find in every RRSP guide online. They carry more risk individually, which is exactly why position sizing and doing your homework matters.
One thing I want to flag upfront: several of these names pay little or no dividend. In an RRSP, that’s actually fine. You don’t get the dividend tax credit inside a registered account anyway, so you’re better off prioritizing total return over yield. The tax deferral does the heavy lifting regardless of whether returns come from capital gains or distributions.
With that framework in mind, here’s what stood out to me when I dug into the numbers on each name.
In This Article
- Barrick Mining Corporation (ABX.TO)
- Scotiabank (BNS.TO)
- George Weston Limited (WN.TO)
- Hydro One Limited (H.TO)
Barrick Mining Corporation (TSX: ABX)
Barrick Gold Corporation, headquartered in Toronto, Canada, is one of the world's largest gold mining companies. Founded in 1983, Barrick's primary business involves the production and sale of gold, with significant copper production as a byproduct...
Competitive Edge
- Barrick's Tier 1 asset portfolio (Nevada Gold Mines JV, Pueblo Viejo, Loulo-Gounkoto, Kibali) provides long mine lives of 10+ years with lower all-in sustaining costs than mid-tier peers, creating a structural cost advantage that widens during gold price downturns.
- The Reko Diq copper-gold project in Pakistan, with one of the world's largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits, gives Barrick a credible organic growth pipeline without needing to overpay for acquisitions in a frothy M&A market for copper assets.
- Dual gold-copper exposure is increasingly valuable as copper demand accelerates from electrification and AI data center buildouts. Copper now contributes ~16.7% of adjusted revenue, providing a natural hedge against gold price volatility and exposure to a structural demand story.
- The 61.5% Nevada Gold Mines JV with Newmont operates in the most politically stable mining jurisdiction globally, reducing sovereign risk that plagues competitors with heavier African or South American exposure.
- Mark Bristow's operator-CEO model, rare among major gold miners, emphasizes owner-operated mines over JVs and partnerships. This reduces agency costs and aligns management incentives with per-share value creation rather than empire building.
By the Numbers
- Net cash position of $2.4B with net debt/EBITDA at -0.18x, while generating OCF-to-debt coverage of 1.91x. This means Barrick could retire its entire $4.7B debt load in roughly six months of operating cash flow, giving it rare financial optionality in a cyclical sector.
- Gold gross profit surged 69.6% YoY on only 28.1% revenue growth, meaning margin expansion is accelerating faster than the gold price. Gold segment gross margin expanded from ~39% to ~51%, showing significant operating leverage as costs stay relatively fixed against rising realized prices.
- Copper gross profit exploded 302.7% YoY to $600M while copper revenue grew 72.5%. Copper segment gross margin jumped from ~17% to ~41%, transforming copper from a marginal contributor into a meaningful profit driver worth roughly 7% of total gross profit.
- FCF 3-year CAGR of 167.8% dwarfs revenue 3-year CAGR of 18.7%, indicating massive cash flow operating leverage. FCF margin of 26.6% with unlevered FCF of $6.3B gives Barrick a shareholder yield of 4.5% (2% dividend + 2.2% buybacks + 0.05% debt paydown).
- SG&A at just 1.15% of revenue signals an extremely lean corporate overhead structure. Combined with interest coverage of 64.6x, Barrick's fixed cost burden is minimal, meaning almost all incremental revenue from higher commodity prices drops to the bottom line.
Risk Factors
- Gold production fell 16.8% YoY to 3.255M oz, the fourth consecutive year of decline from 4.437M oz in FY2021. Revenue growth is entirely price-driven: realized gold price rose 46.1% YoY to $3,501/oz, masking a deteriorating volume trajectory that will cap upside if gold prices flatten.
- FCF-to-net-income conversion of just 57.2% is weak for a miner. Capex-to-depreciation of 1.99x means Barrick is spending nearly double its D&A on capital expenditure, suggesting either reserve replacement pressure or mine development costs that are not yet generating returns.
- Capex-to-OCF of 43.9% consumes nearly half of operating cash flow, and capex per share of $2.34 against FCF per share of $2.99 leaves thin margin for error. If gold prices retreat even 15-20%, FCF could compress dramatically given the high sustaining capital requirements.
- Consensus estimates show revenue peaking around $25.1B in Y3 then declining to $20.6B by Y5, a 18% drop. This implies the market expects either gold price mean-reversion or continued production declines, creating a visible earnings cliff in the medium term.
- Most recent quarter shows copper revenue down 33.3% QoQ and copper gross profit down 45.9% QoQ, suggesting the FY2025 copper surge was heavily front-loaded. Quarterly copper sold dropped 32.8% QoQ, raising questions about whether the annual copper growth rate is sustainable.
Scotiabank (TSX: BNS)
The Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) is a leading multinational financial services provider and one of Canada's Big Five banks. The company operates through four primary business segments: Canadian Banking, International Banking, Global Wealth Management, and Global Banking and Markets...
Competitive Edge
- Scotiabank's Pacific Alliance exposure (Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia) gives it a unique LatAm franchise among Canadian banks. These markets have younger demographics and lower banking penetration than Canada, offering a longer growth runway than purely domestic peers like CIBC.
- The strategic pivot toward wealth management, evidenced by 15% revenue growth and rising mix, reduces earnings volatility and credit risk. Fee-based wealth income is less rate-sensitive than NII, providing a natural hedge as Canadian rates decline.
- As a D-SIB (Domestic Systemically Important Bank), Scotiabank benefits from an implicit government backstop and regulatory barriers to entry that effectively prevent new competitors from challenging its deposit franchise or branch network.
- Recent management shift under CEO Scott Thomson toward a 'North America first' strategy, including the KeyCorp minority stake, signals a pivot away from riskier LatAm credit toward higher-return US commercial banking. This could re-rate the stock closer to US bank multiples.
By the Numbers
- Total shareholder yield of 6.5% (4.5% dividend + 1.1% buyback + 1.5% debt paydown) is among the highest of the Big Five, and the FCF payout ratio of just 21.6% vs. the earnings payout ratio of 65.8% shows the dividend is backed by massive cash generation with wide headroom.
- Provision for loan losses declined 3.5% YoY after growing at a 20.3% 5-year CAGR, suggesting the credit cycle may be turning. Allowance for loan losses also fell 4.2% YoY, the first decline in years, which should release capital and support book value growth.
- Global Banking & Markets EBT surged 32.5% YoY on 21.8% revenue growth, reversing two consecutive years of double-digit profit declines. This segment's operating leverage is significant since it requires minimal incremental capital.
- Global Wealth non-interest income grew 12.5% YoY to $5.4B, now representing over 14% of total revenue, up from roughly 12% three years ago. This fee-based, capital-light revenue stream carries higher ROE and lower credit risk than lending.
- Share count declined 0.64% YoY with SBC at just $14M (0.04% of revenue), meaning buybacks are genuinely shrinking the float rather than offsetting dilution. This is exceptionally clean capital return for a bank.
Risk Factors
- Canadian Banking EBT fell 9.4% YoY despite 3% revenue growth, indicating cost pressures or rising provisions in the domestic book. This is the core earnings engine at 35% of total revenue, and quarterly EBT is showing continued sequential declines.
- International Banking net interest income was flat YoY at $8.9B after three years of strong growth (4.2%, 17.5%, 9.3%), while average assets in that segment declined 2% YoY. The growth engine is stalling, and quarterly NII is declining sequentially.
- The 'Other' segment losses expanded to negative $2.56B in EBT, growing worse every year for four consecutive years. This catch-all absorbs transfer pricing and hedging costs, but its persistent deterioration masks the true profitability of operating segments.
- ROE at 10.9% is below the 12-14% range typical of Canadian Big Five peers, and the 5-year EPS CAGR is negative 1.3%. The bank has struggled to translate balance sheet growth into consistent earnings per share improvement over a full cycle.
- Gross loan book contracted 1.8% YoY, the first decline in the dataset. Combined with the 10-year revenue CAGR of negative 0.5%, this raises questions about whether BNS can grow organically or is managing a shrinking asset base.
George Weston Limited (TSX: WN)
George Weston Limited is a Canadian public company with significant interests in food and drug retail, and real estate. It operates primarily through its two publicly traded subsidiaries: Loblaw Companies Limited, Canada's largest food and drug retailer, and Choice Properties Real Estate Investment Trust, a leading owner, manager, and developer of commercial real estate...
Competitive Edge
- Loblaw's ~30% share of Canadian grocery creates a structural moat through purchasing scale, distribution density, and supplier dependency. No competitor (Metro, Empire/Sobeys) comes close, and foreign entry barriers in Canadian grocery are extremely high due to regulatory and real estate constraints.
- The Loblaw-Choice Properties vertical integration is underappreciated. Choice Properties owns the real estate under Loblaw stores, creating captive long-term leases with built-in rent escalators. This structure locks in occupancy for the REIT and gives Loblaw below-market rent certainty.
- PC Optimum loyalty program with 16M+ members provides proprietary consumer data and switching costs. Combined with President's Choice and No Name private label brands, Loblaw controls both the demand signal and the highest-margin shelf space in its own stores.
- Canadian grocery is structurally oligopolistic with three players controlling ~65% of the market. Regulatory scrutiny (grocery code of conduct) actually reinforces barriers by increasing compliance costs that favor incumbents over potential entrants.
By the Numbers
- FCF payout ratio of just 9.5% vs earnings payout ratio of 38.5% reveals massive retained cash flow capacity. FCF-to-net-income conversion of 1.9x means reported earnings significantly understate cash generation, a hallmark of high earnings quality in retail.
- Buyback yield of 5.5% is driving real share count reduction, with shares declining 2.5% YoY. At $1.9B in TTM repurchases vs $38B market cap, management is aggressively shrinking the float, not just offsetting dilution.
- Total shareholder yield of 7.6% (1.2% dividend + 5.5% buyback + 1.0% debt paydown) is exceptional for a defensive holding company. This three-pronged return mechanism compounds quietly and is often missed by screens focused only on dividend yield.
- PEG ratio of 0.4 against a forward P/E of 21.9x implies the market is pricing in significant earnings acceleration. Consensus EPS jumping from $2.80 trailing to $4.78 in Y1 (71% growth) suggests either large one-time charges are rolling off or structural margin expansion at Loblaw.
- Loblaw EBT surged 19.6% YoY in FY2025 on only 4.7% revenue growth, demonstrating powerful operating leverage. EBT margin expanded from roughly 5.0% to 5.7%, showing the retail subsidiary is converting modest top-line gains into outsized profit growth.
Risk Factors
- Choice Properties EBT collapsed from +$784M to -$59M, a 107.5% decline, likely driven by fair value write-downs on the real estate portfolio. This wiped out roughly $843M in pre-tax income and explains the gap between trailing EPS of $2.80 and forward estimates near $4.78.
- Tangible book value per share is deeply negative at -$13.92, with intangibles comprising 19.4% of total assets. The $7.88 P/B multiple is applied to a thin equity base inflated by goodwill, meaning any impairment would disproportionately crater book value.
- Quick ratio of 0.20 is alarmingly low even for a grocer. While the current ratio of 1.11 looks passable, stripping out inventory reveals almost no liquid buffer, leaving WN vulnerable to any disruption in inventory-to-cash conversion.
- FCF 3-year and 5-year CAGRs are both negative (-4.3% and -6.9% respectively), despite revenue growing. Loblaw capex nearly doubled from $1.18B in FY2021 to $2.06B in FY2025, absorbing cash flow gains. The capex cycle may be peaking, but the trend is unfavorable.
- Revenue growth of just 0.5% YoY and a 3-year CAGR of 2.6% barely keeps pace with Canadian inflation. With a growth grade of 3.5/10, organic top-line expansion is essentially flat in real terms, making WN entirely dependent on margin expansion and buybacks for per-share growth.
Hydro One Limited (TSX: H)
Hydro One Limited is a major electricity transmission and distribution company based in Ontario, Canada. It is responsible for transmitting and distributing electricity to over 1.5 million customers across the province...
Competitive Edge
- Hydro One operates Ontario's only province-wide transmission grid, a natural monopoly with no competitive threat. The OEB regulatory framework provides cost-of-service recovery plus allowed ROE, creating a predictable earnings floor.
- Ontario's electrification push (EVs, heat pumps, data centers, industrial reshoring) is a multi-decade demand tailwind that directly grows Hydro One's rate base without requiring the company to win customers or market share.
- The Province of Ontario retains ~47% ownership, creating implicit government backing that lowers Hydro One's cost of debt and virtually eliminates political risk of adverse regulatory outcomes that could impair the franchise.
- Transmission assets are the highest-quality utility asset class: long-lived, minimal customer interface costs, and highest allowed ROEs. Hydro One's transmission EBIT margin of 58% reflects this structural advantage.
- Grid modernization and climate resilience spending are increasingly viewed as essential infrastructure, reducing regulatory pushback on capex plans. The $3.3B annual capital program has strong political support across party lines.
By the Numbers
- Transmission EBIT grew 13.9% YoY in FY2025 on only 7.1% revenue growth, showing strong operating leverage as rate base investments flow through to allowed returns. Transmission EBIT margin expanded to 58.1%, up from 54.6% in FY2024.
- EPS growth is accelerating: 3Y CAGR of 8.0% vs 5Y CAGR of 7.2%, and analyst estimates project continued acceleration to ~$3.03 by Y5, implying a ~6.3% forward CAGR from current $2.23 trailing EPS.
- OCF-to-net-income ratio of 1.87x indicates strong earnings quality for a regulated utility. Cash earnings significantly exceed reported net income, confirming that depreciation-heavy accounting understates cash generation.
- Share count is essentially flat (0.0006% growth), meaning all EPS growth is organic rather than buyback-driven. For a utility, this discipline is meaningful since many peers dilute through equity issuances to fund capex.
- Distribution segment rebounded strongly in FY2024-FY2025 after a FY2023 dip, with revenue up 10.6% then 6.2% and EBIT up 14.8% then 8.9%. This confirms the FY2023 decline was weather/timing-related, not structural.
Risk Factors
- FCF is deeply negative at -$456M, with capex running at 1.18x operating cash flow. The FCF payout ratio of -1.76x means the dividend is entirely funded by debt issuance, not cash generation. This is sustainable only as long as regulators approve rate base growth.
- Capex-to-depreciation of 3.09x is extremely elevated, meaning the asset base is growing far faster than it depreciates. While this grows rate base, it also means net debt ($19.1B, 5.74x EBITDA) will keep climbing, pressuring credit metrics.
- The PEG ratio of 49.5x is absurd for a utility, reflecting that the 25.8x P/E is pricing in growth that simply doesn't exist at the EPS level. Trailing EPS grew only 2.2% YoY, a fraction of what the multiple implies.
- Current ratio of 0.54 and quick ratio of 0.48 with only $37M cash ($0.06/share) leaves virtually no liquidity buffer. Any disruption to capital market access during a refinancing cycle would be immediately problematic.
- Debt paydown yield is -3.9%, confirming net debt is growing rapidly. Combined with zero buybacks and a 2.3% dividend yield, total shareholder yield is -1.7%, meaning the company is a net taker of capital from the market.
This is the kind of list that forces you to think for yourself. There’s no consensus “best RRSP stock” hiding in here, no name that every analyst on Bay Street is pounding the table on. That’s a feature, not a bug. The best compounding opportunities almost never come with universal approval attached.
What ties these six together is that the market is giving you a chance to buy earnings cheaply. Whether that cheapness is deserved or not is the entire question, and the answer is different for each name. Some of these businesses have real catalysts ahead of them. Others might be cheap because the business is genuinely deteriorating. Your job is to separate the two, and the stock cards above give you a starting point for that work.
I’d rather own a handful of overlooked, reasonably priced businesses inside a tax-deferred account than a basket of expensive blue chips where the next decade of growth is already baked into the price. The math on that is pretty simple. Just make sure you actually believe in the business before you buy it, because conviction is the only thing that keeps you holding through the boring stretches.